

DCI/IC 77-6380

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: Proposed PRC Working Arrangements for Responding to
the Presidential Directive to Define and Prioritize
Substantive Intelligence Requirements

1. Action Requested: That you review the attached draft memorandum to PRC members, proposing recommended working arrangements, preparatory to meeting with Dr. Robert R. Bowie, [redacted] and me to finalize the paper.

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2. Background:

a. Presidential Directive/NSC-17 states that a "...primary function of the PRC intelligence requirement meetings will be to define and prioritize substantive intelligence requirements...." The PRC will thus provide the highest level of guidance for intelligence collection, production and support activities.

b. We assume that "substantive intelligence requirements" in this context refers to the needs of intelligence consumers for data on which to base policy formulation and decisions at the national level. We also assume that "prioritize" means that some form of precedence will be accorded to substantive intelligence requirements reflecting their relative importance.

c. Intelligence activities and interests, like requirements for intelligence, are global and comprehensive. The principal existing internal Intelligence Community tool for dealing with this universe and its priorities is the "Current U.S. Foreign Intelligence Requirements Categories and Priorities" (Attachment to DCID 1/2). This tool provides explicit guidance for the prioritization of substantive requirements which may originate from any quarter, inside or outside the Community. It also pertains to related collection requirements in current operations. The system has an override feature to allow for rapid response to crisis and unforeseen urgent requirements.

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d. The key question with respect to implementation of the PRC functions is that of determining how the substantive concerns and priorities of PRC members can best be served, considering the need to provide for translation from broad guidance into actionable tasks. The response to this question must be pragmatic:

(1) The PRC is expected to meet periodically. Its sessions will require advance planning. The PRC is not a mechanism designed to deal with intelligence responses to fast-moving crises or critical foreign events. It could provide essential guidance during evolution of a prolonged crisis, but it is not likely to react on an emergency basis, so its role should be shaped accordingly.

(2) Since the PRC is a high-level body meeting only periodically, it would seem desirable for the members to focus upon matters which particularly concern them and which they believe to be of high relative precedence. As a practical matter, it would also seem desirable for prioritization of less important substantive concerns to be delegated to the DCI, subject to PRC review. Provision for PRC approval is important to ensure legitimacy for all expressions of requirements and priorities (specifically the format of the Attachment to DCID 1/2).

e. In brief the proposal embodies the following steps. Based upon recent inputs by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we have prepared a tentative listing of "Key Intelligence Concerns" (a tentative term which might be modified according to PRC desires). We propose that the PRC will choose its initial group of substantive intelligence requirements for discussion from this listing, adding any others which may be of interest.

f. Following discussions of each item, you would have prepared for PRC approval a brief paragraph containing the salient points and focus of PRC member interest.

g. We would then adjust the "Current U.S. Foreign Intelligence Requirements Categories and Priorities," document to reflect the PRC guidance and prepare a paper for the PRC showing the relationship between the PRC listing and other high DCID 1/2 priorities. Any possible anomalies resulting from the adjustment would be highlighted.

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h. It is envisioned that the PRC will publish its listing and such changes as it makes in the current priorities. The PRC would address this problem at least quarterly, making such deletions and additions of requirements and revisions of priorities as it deems necessary. Details and rationale for implementing these arrangements, together with a proposed "Key Intelligence Concerns" list, is provided in an attachment to the memorandum to PRC members.

i. How the DCI's staff supports the PRC process is an important consideration. I suggest that the IC Staff (Office of Policy and Planning) serve as the focal point of support to you as Committee Chairman for matters pertaining to requirements and priorities. NFAC, of necessity, will provide an important input, particularly in proposing substantive items and priority changes for PRC consideration. These would be incorporated into the process by ICS/OPP, which would publish the necessary documents and monitor operation of the system.

3. Staff Position: I have forwarded this package to the Director, National Foreign Assessment Center, and the Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking requesting their comments. In the interest of time, I suggest we meet with you to discuss this further.

4. Recommendation: That you call an early meeting of Dr. Robert R. Bowie, [redacted] and myself with you to finalize the draft paper, and dispatch the memorandum to PRC members thereafter.

John N. McMahon

Attachment

Draft memorandum to PRC members

APPROVED: _____
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED: _____
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: _____

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Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300050008-0

Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300050008-0

Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Proposed Working Arrangements for Responding
to the Presidential Directive to Define
and Prioritize Substantive Intelligence
Requirements

Presidential Directive/NSC-17 states that a "... primary function of the PRC intelligence requirements meetings will be to define and prioritize substantive intelligence requirements...." As Chairman of the PRC I am submitting the attached suggested working arrangement to carry out this primary function. I propose that we discuss these arrangements at our initial meeting.

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment:
As stated

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CONCEPT AND WORKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
THE PRC RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL
DIRECTIVE TO DEFINE AND PRIORITIZE
SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

1. Presidential Directive/NSC-17 charges the PRC to define and prioritize substantive intelligence requirements. The purpose of the PRC effort is to provide the highest level of user guidance for intelligence collection and production activities.

2. The term "substantive intelligence requirements" in this context refers to expressions by top-level intelligence consumers of their needs for substantive intelligence to support policymaking and decisions at the national level. The word "prioritize" means that precedence will be accorded to substantive intelligence requirements reflecting their relative importance.

3. Intelligence activities and interests, like intelligence needs, are global and comprehensive. The internal Intelligence Community tool for dealing with this universe and its priorities presently is the "Current U.S. Foreign Intelligence Requirements Categories and Priorities" (Attachment to DCID 1/2). This tool provides explicit priorities guidance on a country-by-country basis for the entire spectrum of substantive requirements for intelligence in the current time period. This

comprehensive priorities system has an override feature to allow for rapid response to critical current foreign events which demand immediate action.

4. A key question with respect to fulfillment of the PRC responsibilities for requirements and priorities is one of determining how PRC interests can best be expressed with appropriate indications of precedence.

5. The following principles should apply to the development and handling of national substantive intelligence requirements and priorities by the PRC:

a. National intelligence consumers will define and prioritize National Foreign Intelligence Requirements through the PRC.

b. Interpretive procedures designed to ensure responsiveness to PRC guidance should provide for comprehensiveness, coherence and compatibility with processes for dealing with detailed requirements for support to consumers at all levels.

c. Intelligence producers will identify gaps in intelligence holdings and will assist consumers in formulating expressions of need. Producers will also develop guidance for intelligence collectors regarding specific information gaps relating to requirements identified by the PRC.

d. The Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking will coordinate the development of strategies for fulfilling substantive intelligence requirements which cannot be fulfilled from available information or from open sources, based upon the priorities established or approved by the PRC.

6. In accordance with these principles, PRC actions will encompass the following:

a. Review of the list of "Key Intelligence Concerns" (Annex A to this paper), which includes contributions by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Using the list as he desires, each PRC member should identify matters of particular interest for discussion and for identification as concerns of high priority. The purpose of the PRC discussion will be to focus upon and to record salient points of interest regarding the nature and priority of each item listed.

b. When the discussions are complete, the Chairman will prepare a paper containing a brief paragraph on each item, summarizing the interest expressed by the PRC members and the impact of the priorities indicated. This paper will be reviewed and approved by the PRC.

c. The PRC will authorize the DCI to establish, with the advice of NFIB, priorities for substantive intelligence

requirements of lesser importance in order to assure the maintenance of a complete and coherent priority system. All priorities will be reflected in a single document, "Current U.S. Foreign Intelligence Requirements Categories and Priorities," approved by the PRC.

d. The PRC shall meet at least quarterly to make such adjustments to substantive requirements and priorities as it deems necessary. Authority to make temporary adjustments between such meetings will be delegated to the DCI. Temporary DCI decisions will be reviewed for approval at subsequent PRC meetings.

7. The process outlined above seeks to fulfill the intent of PD-17 providing for national consumer guidance through the PRC, and at the same time retain the strengths of the existing requirements and priorities process currently used by the Community. The best interests of both PRC members and the Intelligence Community are served through the pragmatic melding of the new concept with established procedures at lower levels.

8. In sum, PRC principals should be selective in devoting attention to defining and prioritizing substantive intelligence requirements. The Committee effort should focus on matters which the PRC members consider to be of relatively high precedence. As a practical matter, the necessary prioritization of lesser substantive concerns and the integration of all

priorities into a compatible whole should be delegated to the DCI, with the advice of senior officials of the Intelligence Community, and subject to PRC review.

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KEY INTELLIGENCE CONCERNS

I. FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS

1. Soviet National Security Policy and Objectives

What is the likely extent of Soviet aggressiveness toward the United States, and in what ways is it likely to be manifested? Which are the most likely areas of confrontation?

What factors are most likely to determine the principal Soviet foreign policy priorities in the next two to three years, how will these factors change over time, and what are the resultant priorities?

What will determine how likely the Soviets are to take risks to pursue their foreign policy objectives?

What objectives in East-West competition do the Soviets regard as attainable in the next decade or so?

2. Soviet Strategic and Conventional Military Capabilities

What are the Soviet capabilities in major classes of offensive and defensive weapons systems, how are they changing over time, and what threats do net assessments indicate they represent to United States and allied forces?

Are there significant prospects of revolutionary technological breakthroughs in Soviet military capabilities?

What factors govern the direction and pace of Soviet military development?

Do the Soviets aspire to achieve a nuclear war-fighting and war-winning posture within the foreseeable future? Do they accept the imperatives of mutual nuclear deterrence?

What are the objectives of the Soviet civil defense program? What are the current and projected programs and states of progress, and what is the effect on the strategic nuclear balance?

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3. SALT and MBFR

What are the principal Soviet objectives at SALT?

What are Soviet intentions with regard to compliance, and to what extent can compliance be effectively monitored?

What are Soviet objectives in MBFR, and what are their bedrock positions?

In the context of MBFR, what arms control measures would strengthen deterrence of an outbreak of hostilities in Europe? What measures would increase the warning time?

4. Sino-Soviet Relations

What is the likelihood of overt hostilities breaking out between the Soviet Union and China?

What is the likely evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute as it will affect the policies of the PRC and the USSR toward each other and toward the U.S.?

What is the likelihood of Sino-Soviet rapprochement, or at least a lessening of tensions, and would the prospect of normalization of PRC-USSR relations impact on the U.S.?

5. Soviet Foreign Activities

What military and policy factors will determine the extent of Soviet "global reach" into Africa, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and Southern Asia?

What does the nature of evolving Soviet military forces imply regarding their intentions in this realm?

6. PRC Strategic Military Capabilities

What are the current and projected strategic offensive and defensive military capabilities of the PRC?

How do these capabilities affect the PRC military posture as compared to the USSR? Other Asian nations? The U.S.?

7. PRC Policies


What are the principal foreign policy goals and priorities of the Chinese, and the main constraints?

What are PRC intentions and capabilities with respect to Taiwan?

To the degree that the Chinese try to extend their influence in the developing world, in what geographical areas, and in what manner, are U.S. and Chinese interests likely to conflict or coincide?

8. NATO/Warsaw Pact Capabilities and Trends

How, and toward what purposes, might the Soviets initiate a war in Europe? What warning would the West have? How might instability in Eastern Europe precipitate a broader European conflict?



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9. Eurocommunism

What are the prospects for change in Western Europe should the influence of national Communist parties continue to increase?


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What are the implications for the United States?



10. Japan

What kind of an-active or passive role can Japan be expected to play in the future in Northeast Asia, to include likely relationships with the PRC and the USSR?



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What Japanese reactions can be expected to U.S. policies in the Western Pacific?

11. Relations with Developing Nations

What is the likely evolution of relationships between the U.S. and the developing world? What are the key factors which will influence this evolution?

How will change in the developing world as a whole affect long-term U.S. interests in terms of political and economic relations?

What developing nations are of greatest economic and security interest because of their likely capacity to influence events? What means are available for influencing their attitudes and actions?

12. Normalization of Relations

Are the PRC's stated conditions for normalization of relations with the U.S. likely to change and, if so, how?

What respective gains and losses would be involved for each country in normalization of U.S. relations with the PRC? What would be the impact of such normalized relations on the Soviet threat to the U.S.? On the rest of Asia?

What respective gains and losses would be involved for each country in normalization of U.S. relations with Cuba and Vietnam? What impact would normalized U.S.-Cuban relations have on the rest of Latin America? What impact would normalized U.S.-Vietnamese relations have in Southeast Asia, and on opinion in Europe and in the Third World?

II. VOLATILE SITUATIONS

13. The Korean Peninsula

What is the balance of military force capabilities between North and South Korea, and what are the trends?

What are the incentives and constraints on North Korean attack initiatives, and what is the likely effect of projected U.S. troop withdrawals?

14. Arab-Israeli Negotiations and Prospects

What are the likely elements of an Arab-Israeli settlement as a result of negotiations, and what are the political dynamics which affect the ability of the negotiating parties to make important decisions?



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16. Dynamics of Southern Africa

What is the current potential for an outbreak of major conflict in Southern Africa?

In Rhodesia, what factors will determine the feasibility of a solution involving black majority rule? What are the prospects for an escalation of the conflict to include an even wider circle of external supporters?

Regarding Namibia, what factors will affect South Africa's agreement to an internationally acceptable settlement on the future of Namibia, and what external actions would most influence its decision?

In South Africa, what degree of change is the government prepared to introduce, and under what circumstances? How strong are internal pressures and counter-pressures for change? What external pressures would the South Africans respond to, and how?

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17. Dynamics in the Horn of Africa



Can the Soviet Union successfully maintain a relationship with both Ethiopia and Somalia and, if so, what are the implications of this for the future of the region?

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III. TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

18. Nuclear Proliferation

What are the near-term and mid-term prospects of nuclear proliferation, particularly as it affects areas of regional conflict?

What countries are seeking or are likely to seek a nuclear weapons capability? What are their motivations?

How are the energy plans of nuclear and non-nuclear countries influencing the demand for sensitive fuel cycle technologies that could contribute to nuclear weapons capabilities?

19. Conventional Arms Transfers

What are the worldwide political and security implications of the current distribution of conventional arms?

To what extent do U.S. arms sales and transfers inhibit or encourage the outbreak of hostilities in specific areas?

What are the prospects of securing cooperation of West European suppliers, the Soviet Union and other countries in taking multilateral measures to restrain the arms trade?

20. Human Rights

What is the current status of the observance of human rights worldwide, and to what extent can the U.S. influence human rights outcomes in other nations?

What are the current and potential effects of internal dissidence on human rights issues in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe?

What will be the impact of U.S. emphasis on human rights on the attainment of other U.S. objectives in the multilateral financial institutions?

What is the latitude for increased observance of human rights in countries with which the U.S. has a special relationship?

Thus far, what has been the impact of U.S. action on behalf of human rights?

21. International Terrorism

What are the organizations, modes of operation, and sources of financing of major terrorist groups?

What is the relationship between terrorist groups and various sovereign states, and to what extent do they influence the policies and activities of one another?

What are likely new areas for the application of terrorist methods?

22. International Energy

What are the likelihood and implications of significant reductions in the international supply and distribution of oil and of increases in price?

What would be the political and economic impact on the industrial, oil-importing nations? On the oil-importing developing countries?

What would be the effect on the negotiating posture of the less developed countries as a whole in the North-South relationship?

23. Global Environment

What are the global environmental issues that must be confronted in the near future if we are to avoid problems for the U.S. in the next decade?

What kinds of bilateral or multilateral solutions are feasible? What mutually advantageous solutions might be found with the developing countries?

What political and technical impediments are likely to be encountered?

24. International Economics

What are the political and economic forces that will affect the economic strength of the industrial democracies and their ability to work together?

What are the major economic dangers which confront the members of the Western Alliance? What institutional innovations and changes in the international economic and financial institutions are suggested by analysis?

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